Baker with Thomas M. Google Scholar. Thomas Thornton New York: Broadway, , Beck, In English, the best overall narratives remain Konrad H. Zelikow presented further comments on the diplomacy and international historical context of German Unification at the present conference, which unfortunately could not appear in this volume.
QUINT,P.E., The imperfect union. Princteon - Vico Verlag & Antiquariat
Kiron K. Skinner Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, , —54, which significantly broadens discussion from Gorbachev to the many specific variables making German Unification possible, and Sarotte, Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: U. A different story emerges from Russia, where the entire process is viewed as a dramatic loss of power and stature.
See, for example, Vladislav M. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S. Article PDF first page preview. Issue Section:. You do not currently have access to this article. Download all figures. Sign in. You could not be signed in. Sign In Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution Sign in. This article is also available for rental through DeepDyve.
View Metrics. It thus combined organised liberalism, Christian social doctrines and liberal social democracy e. So, after debate during the late Weimar Republic and into the Nazi era, Ordoliberalism established itself as a leading regulatory mode of West Germany after the Second World War. In the postwar meeting of ideology and institutional structures, foreign involvement in the West German economy, particularly the Marshall Plan, as well as a strong orientation towards export, joined the domestic notions of Ordnungspolitik regulatory policy or a politics of order and Sozial Marktwirtschaft social market economy.
Together, these were decisive postwar German responses of a humanist liberalism to interwar depression, national socialism and Bolshevism. As with other political economic arrangements in capitalism, embedded Ordoliberalism was a class compromise.
The late s in West Germany saw almost four-fifths of the workforce striking for socialist goals of codetermination and industrial nationalisation — a strike wave put down with protest prohibitions and tanks on the streets, plus price controls on everyday goods Dale and El-Enany, : By , the two major parties of West Germany came together around an Ordoliberal belief in the primacy of markets with stringent regulation and considerable social insurance commitments.
The postwar West German state is thus conceived as neither statist nor laissez-faire, but market enabling and socially protective Streeck, The two decades before re-unification i. Governments chipped away layers of social protection — although haltingly and rousing substantial opposition. Even so, the Social Democratic Party SPD rolled out a strong version of what many still understand as the social democratic German model in the s.
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The SPD model institutionalised participation of well-organised interests such as centralised unions, business associations and government into a corporatist structure, creating, by international standards, a labour-heavy and time-consuming process of policymaking and implementation. In this Reagan and Thatcher era, Kohl had initially led with a radical Anglo-American-style neoliberal program.
He soon retracted it, returning to a more familiar corporatist model but flanking it with minor changes that have edged towards the core over time. In some respects, an Ordoliberal and neoliberal marriage seems unlikely, with tensions in policy approaches and administration across ministries.
Nevertheless, as in other places where social conservatism has joined laissez-faire Boucher and Sharpe, ; Cooper, , Ordoliberal Christian precepts such as family support, traditional morals and subsidiarity can dovetail with neoliberal criticism of welfare regimes. Together, they promulgate private responsibility as economic and moral imperatives. However, Ordoliberal and neoliberal approaches to regulation are contradictory. For the original Ordoliberals, the chief economic problem in capitalism was not the state but private economic cartels i.
If German economic life still honours some aspects of Ordoliberal thought, this key problematic is what seems to have been displaced in a shift to neoliberalism: the neoliberal concern with welfare spending, national budgets and so on reveals that private cartels are less concerning than the state.
Or, rather, the state is now the untrustworthy cartel — and if it must exist, it should be parsimonious and disperse its holdings. The ideal image of a combined Ordoliberalism and neoliberalism, invoked by Chancellor Merkel since the —8 financial crisis, is a political economy modelled after an austere German household — the proverbial homemaker, living modestly and keeping a tight watch on their finances: erst sparen, dann kaufen first save, then buy.
After the s, privatisation had not been widespread in West Germany, where public holdings were minor compared with other OECD nations. Ordoliberalism influenced the first, postwar, majority sale of companies such as Volkswagen sold in , as Ordnungspolitik proposed that the rule-setting state should not engage in production Huffschmid, Ordoliberalism then held Keynesian public work construction at bay Streeck, : 69— Yet privatisation proceeds in the period — in Germany were only 0.
These low figures may appear surprising, given the intensive period of German privatisation during re-unification. It was set up before re-unification, in March , as a liberalising GDR government began to reorganise property rights particularly in industry, finance and agriculture Thomerson, Soon after the Wall fell, GDR economists, activists and politicians debated new economic approaches in a moribund economy. Something like the Treuhand became a shared goal. It was also an anti-corruption technology: to avoid functionaries selling or hoarding GDR assets for private gain in the post-Wall confusion, the state moved social property to a public trust overseen by this agency.
The Treuhand, however, was relentlessly embattled. The economic crisis that followed currency union, across Germany but particularly in the East, saw the Treuhand take on a new role, as it tried to sell rapidly depreciating assets. The Treuhand was eyed by neoliberals in western Germany as the vehicle by which to radically overhaul the eastern German economy Webber, The agency was a considerable prize, and western administrators wasted little time — its final GDR board member was gone by June In total, the Treuhand held 12, enterprises: were fully privatised, of these went to their former owners, transferred to local councils, were sold to former employees or managers; and were shut Huffschmid, This meant an enormous asymmetrical concentration of power at the expense of eastern German actors.
They co-opted unions which had undertaken wildcat strikes in early , previously hostile state governments and business organisations. And yet these announced changes could not be implemented, in part due to the economic collapse. The Treuhand closed with significant debt at a time of national recession, reversing its expected windfall to lose some DM — billion reported figures vary. On one measure, it was incredibly successful, with the GDR transforming from a state-owned to a privately owned economy in just a few years.
On others, such as social consequences and economic sustainability, it failed.
West German firms were largely uninterested in what the Treuhand had on offer. Firms were either startled by the economic collapse across the post-Soviet and eastern states, which left no promising new markets, or anxious about operating in unknown parts of the country. In the last years, this inattention could be addressed, due to slowing sales and a belated policy to revamp and preserve some eastern industrial centres Carlin and Soskice, ; Land, ; Roesler, ; Zatlin, Like much privatisation, fiscal short-sightedness had long-term social consequences.
Scholars and politicians still openly debate whether a new Mezzogiorno was created Boltho et al. Benefits for unemployment, insurance and the labour market made up almost a fifth of eastern German income Webber, : —1. From to , privatisation saw a third of jobs gone.
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In manufacturing, this rises to three-quarters of all jobs shed. Given the scale of job losses, this privatisation produced opposition beyond the unions. The Treuhand chairman was assassinated in The assailant remains unknown but many assume it to be an affiliate of the Red Army Faction or a former Stasi employee. These links may be apocryphal, but we can nevertheless read the assassination as a motivated response to some strong economic medicine doled out to the former East.
The Treuhand was intentionally a key site of ideological and material antagonism.
Despite belated attempts to salvage its reputation, the Treuhand was exempted from the West German model, with neoliberal logics applied to rationalise its extensive holdings Cassell, Those workers who remained in the industrial labour market were subject to experiments with forms of work organisation, particularly in the motor industry.
Eastern Germans were surprisingly well equipped for the working rhythms of post-Fordist or Toyotist productions. This post-Fordist system would also underwrite a move away from the socialist model of full-time employment. This set a precedent for trends in German industrial relations Chavance and Labrousse, : —7.
Even where they existed, industry-wide wage agreements were increasingly ignored by eastern employers. With shifts away from the West German model came increasingly punitive social welfare measures and a strengthened hand for capital in negotiations. Wage restraints were introduced, limitations on temporary employment were lifted and the social wage was lowered.